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Emerging markets have enjoyed a protracted period of rapid growth in recent years, 
underpinned by sustained, strong growth in China and buoyant world commodities prices. 
However, Chinese growth has slowed signicantly since 2012 against a backdrop of weak 
economic conditions in the US, EU and Japan – the consumer markets for China – and this, 
plus an oversupply of key commodities, has weakened global commodity prices signicantly. 
As a result, export revenues have declined and the terms of trade deteriorated for many 
commodity-exporting nations in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. 
ese developing countries face severe economic challenges in the medium term, confronted 
with protracted weakness in global commodity demand, owing especially to the structural 
trend of China’s transition to a more moderate pace of economic growth and the cyclical 
impact eect of US Fed monetary policy tightening.
Among the early casualties are some of the largest emerging markets, including several 
BRICS economies. Russia and Brazil are both large commodity exporters and were already in 
recession in 2015, while another eponymous BRICS country, South Africa, has also been 
deeply impacted by the decline in global commodity prices.
Many other commodity-exporting emerging markets are also vulnerable to the economic 
impact of long-term global commodity price weakness and the slowdown in the Chinese 
economy. is brings with it risks of deteriorating scal revenues and weakening capital 
inows, which could generate large economic shocks to emerging markets with more 
vulnerable macroeconomic fundamentals. is would be a considerable setback to 
international eorts to eradicate extreme poverty as well as to other UN sustainable 
development goals, as envisaged for the United Nations post-2015 development agenda. 
Consequently, there is an urgent need for policy reforms in many of the 
commodity-exporting nations in order to fashion greater resilience to such external shocks 
and reduce their economic vulnerability.
THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S SLOWDOWN ON EMERGING MARKETS.
Over the past decade, China has emerged as an increasingly important growth engine for the 
global economy, as its share of world GDP has risen from 5% in 2005 to around 15% by 
2015, making it the world’s second largest economy after the US. China’s dramatic economic 
ascent has driven rapid growth in bilateral trade with many developing countries. In the 
aftermath of the global nancial crisis in 2008-09, China’s importance as a global growth 
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engine has risen even more, accounting for around one-third of world economic growth over 
the past seven years (Lagarde, 2015).
However, after three decades during which Chinese economic growth averaged around 10% 
per year, the country is, in addition to its more short-term woes due to falling export demand 
and a residential property sector downturn, beginning also to undergo a signicant economic 
transition towards a more moderate long-term growth path as its economy matures and 
ageing demographics and declining productivity growth gradually erode its potential 
economic growth rate. China’s real GDP growth rate has decelerated from a pace of 10.6% 
in 2010 to 7.3% in 2014, with momentum moderating further to an estimated 6.9% in 
2015. Moreover the resource-intensity of China’s economic growth may also have peaked, as 
the structure of the economy gradually shifts away from resource-intensive heavy industries 
towards a more service-sector driven economic structure, as its economy matures and 
consumer expenditure patterns shift towards a higher share of expenditure on services.
THE SLUMP IN GLOBAL COMMODITY PRICES.
Global commodity prices have already slumped signicantly since 2012, as key commodities 
have suered from overcapacity as nal consumer demand, mainly in the West, has stagnated 
or declined as well as due to oversupply issues due to recent capacity expansion in key 
commodities such as coal, iron ore and oil. But the slowdown in aggregate (not merely 
consumer) demand in China is also a key element in the weakness of global commodity 
prices. Chinese GDP growth in 2015 is estimated to be around 6.9 per cent, which is almost 
4 percentage points slower than in 2010, when Chinese GDP growth was 10.6 per cent. 
China is the major market for almost all internationally traded commodities, not just 
industrials like iron ore, coal and oil. e downturn in the Chinese residential construction 
sector since 2013 has been a signicant contributing factor in weakening Chinese demand 
for construction materials such as steel and copper.
 
e transmission eects of weaker metals prices are already having a signicant impact on 
resource exporters, as reected in the decision by Glencore to suspend operations at several 
copper mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, which will hit exports and 
scal revenue for both of those economies. Chinese demand for imported coal has also 
slumped signicantly during 2014 and 2015, reecting greater use of domestic coal resources 
as well as Chinese government eorts to limit coal consumption as part of its initiatives to 
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stabilise carbon emissions. is has hit coal exporting nations, with Indonesia suering 
particularly large declines from declining Chinese coal import volumes. Total Chinese coal 
imports fell by an estimated 30% in the 2015 calendar year, with further declines in Chinese 
coal imports expected in 2016.
e collapse in global oil prices in late 2014 created another shockwave for many emerging 
market economies, given that so many emerging markets, even the larger ones, such as 
Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq, Iran, Russia and the Persian Gulf oil producers are still heavily 
dependent on oil and gas as a key source of export value and scal revenues. e impact of lower 
oil prices is already being felt: even Saudi Arabia, which had massive accumulated foreign 
exchange reserves estimated at US$746 billion in August 2014, has seen a rapid slide, falling to 
an estimated 635 billion by November 2015 due to its large scal expenditure program and the 
sharp drop in export revenues from oil. e IMF has projected that Saudi Arabia will run a 
budget decit of around 20% of GDP in 2015 (IMF, 2015). e IMF has also projected that 
the six Gulf Co-operation Council States will see their combined budget surplus of US$76 
billion in 2014 turn into a combined budget decit of US$113 billion in 2015.
While the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States have relatively strong scal reserves to 
withstand such a scal shock for some period of time, other oil exporting nations are much 
more vulnerable, notably Venezuela. at nation’s ongoing economic crisis has escalated due 
to the fall in global oil prices. e Venezuelan central bank has estimated that Venezuela’s GDP 
contracted by 7% in 2015, while the IMF forecasts a further 6% decline in GDP for 2016. 
e scal decit is likely to have been around 20% of GDP in 2015, with increasing and 
credible risks of a debt crisis that could see Venezuela defaulting on its debt in the near future. 
President Maduro declared a 60-day national economic emergency on 15 January 2016 due to 
slumping GDP and hyperination that reached 141% year-on-year in late 2015.
Governments in oil-exporting countries had already slashed their oil price assumptions for 
their 2015 budgets, yet continuing conditions of signicant oversupply in global oil markets, 
and an increase in Iranian oil exports anticipated following the lifting of economic sanctions 
in January 2016, has pushed the Brent crude benchmark oil price down to around US$29 as 
at 15 January 2016, well below the budgetary oil price assumptions for 2015 used by most of 
these governments. 
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VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKETS.
In the aftermath of the global nancial crisis in 2008-09, with very weak growth in the US, 
EU and Japan, capital ows to emerging markets strengthened signicantly as global 
investors sought higher yields and better earnings growth in the faster growing economies of 
Asia and Latin America. However, the investment landscape changed signicantly after 2013, 
as growth in China and other large emerging markets like Brazil and Russia has slowed, and 
the slump in global commodity prices has dampened the economic outlook for 
commodity-exporting emerging markets. 
e US Federal Reserve System is expected to begin a policy cycle of monetary tightening, 
which will tend to increase the attractiveness of the US dollar and dollar-denominated assets 
relative to emerging-markets asset classes. ese trends have increased the risks that 
previously high capital ows into many emerging markets could slow signicantly over the 
medium term. is would result in weaker net capital inows for commodity-exporting 
developing countries, which are already facing a signicant slowdown in export earnings 
from commodities. 
e deteriorating macroeconomic prole for many resource-exporting developing countries 
is also likely to result in deteriorating credit ratings for the more vulnerable nations, 
increasing their cost of borrowing in international debt markets. It could also further reduce 
the ow of international bank nance to them. 
e Institute of International Finance has estimated that emerging markets in 2015 saw total 
net capital outows of around US$540 billion, the rst time they have seen net capital 
outows since 1988 (Financial Times, 2015). Capital outows out of China are estimated to 
be a very signicant contributor to these net capital outows, while the Central Bank of Russia 
has estimated capital outows out of Russia in the rst ten months of 2015 at US$50 billion.
THE OUTLOOK FOR EMERGING MARKETS.
e combination of slower Chinese growth, the slump in global commodity prices, and 
theprospect of Fed monetary tightening indicates that emerging markets are facing a much 
more challenging global economic outlook over the medium term than they have in the 
recent past. e vulnerability of dierent emerging markets varies considerably, reecting a 
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wide range of factors such as macroeconomic resilience, degree of dependence on commodity 
exports, vulnerability to capital outows, and banking sector instability. Nevertheless, 
macroeconomic, external-account and debt indicators overall have shown signicant 
deterioration during 2015 for a large number of emerging markets.
With the outlook for commodity prices expected to remain weak during 2016, many 
emerging-market commodity exporters face a protracted period of weak commodity export 
demand compounded by oversupply due to recent capacity expansion in some key 
commodities that will damage their external account position as well as erode their scal 
balance. Furthermore, many commodity-exporting nations, having experienced signicant 
currency depreciation against the USD during 2014-15 as a result of slumping commodity 
prices and weakening export earnings, face increasing debt-servicing costs for their foreign 
currency-denominated debt.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.
Most developing countries in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East 
remain highly dependent on commodities as a key source of export earnings and scal 
revenues. e current slump in global commodity prices and the prospects of a protracted 
period of weakness as China’s maturing economy transitions to a less resource-intensive 
growth path creates major risks and challenges to resource-exporting nations. 
Unlike East Asia, which has followed a path of industrialisation and manufacturing 
export-led growth for decades, many nations in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa have 
not yet successfully developed a more diversied economic structure in which manufacturing 
plays a signicant role in either exports or domestic value-added. 
To address this crisis we oer six key policy recommendations for developing countries. 
(1) Formulate long-term development plans and stick to them. 
e secret of the Asian tigers was their governments’ ability to sustain development policies 
over the long term. e Asian tigers did not apply the Washington Consensus dogmatically; 
they were not shy about intervening in the economy, whilst the opening to international 
nance and the liberalisation of international commerce were generally cautious, selective 
and pragmatic. Political stability attracts private investment and allows societies to build on 
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past achievements. e nurturing of export clusters and the qualication of the work force 
for economies of scale enabled a catch-up in manufacturing technology that soon evolved 
highly complex, technology-based economies (Salam, 2012).
Democratic countries may have a harder time of it, but they need to concentrate none the less 
on building a durable consensus around long-term development policies. e main problem 
appears to be partisan gridlock, and the temptation is to suspend democracy, as has so often 
been done in Latin American political history – “at least to the extent of development policy” 
(though it is not really possible to suspend democracy “just a little bit”). ankfully, the days 
of coups and juntas in Latin America are mostly gone by, yet the exigency of nding durable 
consensus on certain overarching issues never goes away. What developed countries have long 
done to evade the distempers of democracy is to repair to the supranational level to forge their 
policy consensus. A supranational organisation to formulate and set specically development 
policy – not just trade policy, – or trade subsumed under a common development policy, may 
be what Latin America needs most of all. Development usually is conceived as a domestic 
issue, but more and more it needs to be realised how much domestic development implicates 
international relations and international trade and vice versa. A regional development 
policy-making organ might be more popular and not so controversial as the multitude of 
failed regional trade blocs have been, as it would be focussed everywhere on fostering, 
foremost, the domestic but also the regional capacity of Latin American nations for creating 
wherewithal to trade, instead of haggling over the spoils of trade long after it is too late to 
address the lack of the wealth of nations in the region to trade with. Democratic 
accountability for the execution of supranationally made development policies would of 
course remain essential in such a regional “development condominium”. 
(2) Improve the international competitiveness of the business environment.
After three decades in which China was the low-cost factory of the world, rising 
manufacturing wages in coastal China are forcing multinationals to look farther aeld for 
lower-cost labour, furnishing opportunities for other emerging markets to attract new 
manufacturing investment. New locations, however, need to provide cost-eective, stable 
environments for investors. 
All too many countries in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East are 
exacerbating cost and protability problems for business due to a range of issues that has 
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reduced their competitiveness compared to the industrialised nations of North America, 
Europe and East Asia.  According to the World Bank Ease of Doing Business 2016 Survey, 
many of the countries in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East stand 
relatively low in the world rankings. 
In Latin America there are some success stories, with Mexico ranked 38th in the world, Chile 
48th, Peru 50th, and Colombia 54th out of the global index of 189 nations. Nevertheless, many 
other Latin American nations still rank very low on the global scale, with Brazil ranked 116th, 
Ecuador 117th, Argentina 121st, and Venezuela 186th, almost at the bottom of the world.
Similarly, the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Survey of Sub-Saharan Africa portrays a 
region of nations ranked very low in terms of the international ease of doing business. South 
Africa, which is the region’s industrial leader, is only ranked 73rd, Kenya is 108th, Ghana 114th, 
Tanzania 139th, and Nigeria 169th.
In the Middle East it is perhaps surprising that some oil-rich nations still rank poorly in the 
Survey despite having had for decades considerable scal resources that could have been 
expended on establishing best practice governance standards and an attractive business 
environment. e rankings, however, suggest that this has not always happened in practice: 
Qatar is ranked 68th, Saudi Arabia 82nd, and Kuwait 101st. By contrast, the UAE, ranked 31st 
in the world, stands out as a success story in the Middle East. With the lifting of economic 
sanctions, a new window of opportunity may be opening for Iran, currently ranked at 118th, 
to create a more internationally friendly business environment for investment, as many global 
investors can explore opportunities there for the rst time in many years.
In order to address the lack of international competitiveness, many of these nations need to 
embark on far more aggressive strategies to reduce regulatory burdens and barriers to 
investment. For example, the excessive bureaucracy and patchy taxation systems in Latin 
America are a great deterrent to investors. e high cost of employment in manufacturing, 
and labour-intensive industries in general, are a signicant barrier to the growth of that 
sector. ese costs are not high salaries so much as a multitude of taxes of various kinds.
Around ¼ of Latin American States’ scal income comes from taxation of commodities 
production. e incapacity of the State to control taxation and the preponderant informality 
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of the economy makes it more dependent on royalties to nance itself. However, royalties are 
nominal or non-existent in many Latin American countries, hence State revenue is meagre at 
all events. e weakness of the State is also reected in the compensation strategy of imposing 
on some sectors of the formal economy a disproportionately and unprotably high tax 
burden. Simplifying the taxation system and investing scal resources in enforcement will 
provide a more sustainable and stable source of income to the State.
(3) Invest in research and development.
Economic development is known to be in causal nexus with the expansion of industry and 
knowledge-intensive services. e development of these sectors generates a number of 
positive externalities that tend to accelerate economic growth; including human capital 
formation, network externalities, and technological spillover. As the spectrum of goods and 
services widens, the extremes of the business cycle that endanger long-term growth are 
dampened (Frenkel & Rapetti, 2011).
Manufacturing is becoming digital and technologies are converging. Intelligent software, 
new materials, robots with high dexterity, and 3D printers, facilitating the making of 
prototypes of almost anything, are changing the course of business. e geography of supply 
chains is also changing: – most of the work will not be done in classical factories, but in 
oces manned by designers, engineers and logistics experts. e production in the developed 
countries that was driven oshore by lower labour costs will return, where logistics and 
technological advantages allow for quicker and less costly response to the markets.
A ird Industrial Revolution is thus in the ong, and Latin American and African countries 
have an opening to catch on to the new world without the drag of existing or “sunk” capital 
investments. What is needed above all is to invest in scientic research and development, 
perhaps in partnership with the developed countries of Europe, North American and Japan; 
and in the education of the populace in all of the relevant competences. Some of the most 
successful East Asian emerging markets have a relatively high share of R&D expenditure to 
total GDP, including South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.
e gap in Latin America is all too high between the training oered by its education systems 
and the skills in actual demand on the labour market. More than almost any other region in 
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the world Latin America faces massive shortages of skilled labour and human capital. In 
concrete terms, 36% of businesses report having diculties nding employees with adequate 
formation and training (OECD, 2014α). When asked what skills are needed, Latin America 
businesses answered that it was “soft skills” that were especially scarce. ese are additional to 
cognitive competence: involving aspects such as critical thinking, responsibility, teamwork, 
ability to solve complex problems, and oral and written communication.
According to the Report of OECD/ECLAC/CAF, “Latin American Economic Outlook 
2016”, published in 2015, skills and technological progress are key priorities for Latin 
America’s future competitiveness: “Skills are the key to reap the benets of technological 
change that will transform the nature of jobs. Technological progress will be at the heart of 
the capacity of both China and Latin America to avoid the middle-income trap” 
(OECD/ECLAC/CAF, 2015:148.)
Yet the training provided by business is perfunctory, as the funding for it comes mainly from 
the “bottom lines” of companies, so that it is tightly focussed on the specic needs of 
employees in executing their immediate tasks. Ironically, individuals bringing a higher level 
of skill to their companies receive more training, which widens the gaps between skilled and 
unskilled employees. It is rare for Latin American businesses to receive State subsidies for the 
occupational training of their employees, and the smaller the business, the fewer subsidies are 
available, despite the greater need for resources than the larger ones (OECD, 2014β).
Another factor demanding attention is the disconnect between what young people are apt to 
study and what the country needs to innovate and grow. In Argentina for example, for every 
1000 law school graduates, there are 1428 economists and business managers, 372 psychologists, 
300 engineers, 51 chemists, 29 mathematicians and nine physicists, annually (Guadagni, 2013).
ese yawning gaps urgently need to be addressed. e quality of secondary education must 
be enhanced in much of Latin America and Africa, and those pursuing higher education 
guided toward commercially relevant disciplines. e State must provide stimulus for 
training by the private sector, especially apprenticeships, as are common in advanced nations 
like Germany.
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(4) Promote reindustrialisation and re-focus on manufacturing. 
Economic growth based on commodity exports is not sustainable, as commodity prices do 
not reect trends in productivity, which is what sustains growth. e global index for 
commodity prices is perennially volatile: e.g., it increased 142% from 2002 to 2008, then fell 
28% from 2008 to 2009, only to increase 62% from 2009 to 2011 (Cypher, 2015:124). e 
value added to the domestic GDPs of commodity-exporting countries was correspondingly 
volatile – not a good development strategy:
What is worse, that volatility registered a stunning increase of 175% from the decade 
1990-2000 to the decade 2000-2009, implying that countries dependent on exporting 
commodities are more and more exposed to price shocks (UNDP, 2011:59). 
Overreliance on primary products makes for dependency and vulnerability to the vagaries of 
the commodity-importing countries. Latin America and Africa are particularly at risk due to 
the large number of countries which are dependent on resource exports:
Rounding out this picture, in 2013, commodities exports accounted for 73% of total exports 
to China from Latin America (OECD/ECLAC/CAF, 2015).
Currently, China’s imports are decreasing as its economic growth engine transitions from 
State-led investment to the stimulus of consumption. As wages improve in China, luxury 
imports are set to increase, whilst commodity imports, fuelled by the infrastructure boom, 
are bound to slow down or even decrease (Bradsher & Duhigg, 2012).
e uncertainty generated from commodity price uctuations hampers economic growth and is 
associated with increases in poverty. Indeed, the correlation between changes in commodity prices and 
economic growth is striking ... Examining economic growth rates for developing economies against 
the annual rate of change of commodity prices for the period 1995–2009 nds an 87 percent 
correlation between the two variables. (UNDP, 2011:68)
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in 2011 agricultural, 
mineral, and commodity raw materials represented 76 percent of the exports of the countries of the 
Union of South American Nations, compared to only 34 percent for the world as a whole. e 
manufacture of advanced technology, in comparison, represented 7 percent and 25 percent, 
respectively ... China’s entry in the global market compounds the situation, as it quickly imposes itself 
as an unequal partner in respect to commercial exchange with dierent countries of the region. 
(Svampa, 2015:65-66)
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In some Latin American countries like Colombia, the late emphasis on commodities in the 
context of trade with China has altered the production prole of domestic agricultural and 
industrial sectors, moving capital into job-poor investments which deepen the inequality gap. 
Similarly, there have been decreases in the industrial component of the GDPs of Brazil, Peru, 
Chile, Mexico and Colombia.
Many African countries, too, have been developing their resource export sectors due to the 
rapid growth of Chinese demand for African commodities over the last decade. However, 
with Chinese demand slowing down and commodities prices slumping, commodity 
export-based development strategies are likely to face extreme diculties over the medium 
term, as falling commodity prices and weakening demand curtail new investment inows 
into the mining sector. Oil and gas have been a key new frontier of economic development 
for many African countries in the last decade, with new oil and gas discoveries made in 
countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana and Mozambique. But with international oil 
companies signicantly cutting back their exploration and development budgets due to the 
collapse in world oil prices, new investment inows into the upstream African oil and gas 
sectors are likely to be cut back signicantly, at least over the next two or three years.
With the resources sector outlook having weakened considerably in the near- to 
medium-term outlook, industrial development ought to be given a considerably higher 
priority in the development plans of many African countries. is will be essential for 
diversifying the economic base of the many African countries that are excessively dependent 
on mineral and agricultural commodity exports, as well as for generating an important source 
of employment growth. 
According to research by the Brookings Institution, in 2010 the average manufacturing 
value-added share of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa was only 10 per cent, the same as in 1970. 
Brookings calculate that Africa’s share of world manufactured exports is just 0.2 per cent. at 
means that Sub-Saharan Africa has shown no progress in deepening industrialisation for the 
last four decades (Brookings Institution, 2014). Nevertheless, their country research does 
point to several hopeful case studies, notably Mauritius and Tunisia, which have tried to follow 
development strategies which are closer to the East Asian economic development model.
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Premature deindustrialisation follows on from the way some governments practice their 
openness to external markets. e conditions for industrialisation have to be satised in 
actual practice by judicious governmental economic policies across an array of variables; viz. 
developing industrial clusters with international competitive advantage; establishment of free 
trade zones; developing a skilled manufacturing workforce; working with multinationals to 
develop local manufacturing supply chains; development of best-practice local content 
policies; and accelerated development of infrastructure to support industrialisation.
(5) Promote internal and regional markets.
Latin American and African countries must make massive investments in science, technology 
and innovation if they want to escape the middle income and deindustrialisation trap. e 
scale of the investment needed, however, exceeds the capacities of most nations in these 
regions, and thus it is duplication of eort which must be anathematised. Regional 
cooperation agendas for Latin America and also for Sub-Saharan Africa are needed to 
facilitate the scale and eciency of these long-term investments. is can only benet the 
whole region: 
A well-crafted bloc can raise eciency – and economic welfare – in its member countries by facilitating 
consumer choice and increasing the competition that producers face. Dropping tari barriers enlarges 
markets and gives more ecient producers entry into countries where their prices had been inated by 
duties and other trade barriers. (Schi & Winters, 2003:31)
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e sad fact is that Latin America, more than any other region of the world, is strewn with 
the wreckage of failed schemes of regional market integration. ere is no easy way out of this 
trap: even the most successful nations and economies have had to wrestle with it for 
generations. In the history of the United States, the southern and northern States, 
notwithstanding a bond so potent as a common federal government, clashed never more 
ercely over slavery than over free trade versus protectionism. ey only managed to hold 
their union together by war. 
Such are the stakes in regional integration. Latin America faces many obstacles to simple 
market integration – some purely physical, like gigantic mountain ranges and vast rainforests 
that probably ought to be environmentally protected from development, but others quite 
cultural and conceptual. Regional economic integration will never be a sustainable reality until 
all parties, all classes, all societies, all nations, all peoples realise gains from it that are, and are 
felt to be essentially equal – and that before one even reaches the matter of international trade 
with China or anyone else.
Market integration is needed, of course, but adjuvant and complementary to that there must 
be agreed sucient means and common schemes for developing productivity and its 
correlative income gains up to roughly the same level across the whole region, so that member 
states will not be tempted to withdraw from a regional arrangement in order to protect their 
people from the productive capacity of other member states, whose competitive challenges 
cannot be met within one’s own existing productive capacity.
(6) Adopt a more forward-looking geostrategic foreign policy. 
Commodity-dependent emerging markets in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Middle East need to reassess their long-term future in a more pragmatic way than they have 
ever done before. eir prospects are not as rosy as some of their governments have previously 
assumed, nor have their interests been duly served by the China-driven return to 
commodity-export dependency; a fact that the current depression in commodity prices 
proves beyond all doubt. Obviously, Latin America needs a regional geostrategy that will 
concentrate on what is to be done after the morning after the party. Without a grand central 
vision for the whole of Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East, each one of 
its nations can be “picked o”, as it were, just as single brigades and regiments of an army 
without a supreme commander might be defeated one by one by an overall inferior force, but 
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one that can bring o local superiority on the battleeld. Latin America will have to ght for 
its long-term economic future, in its political relations with China as well as economic, and 
it must ght in concert if it would have any hope of winning. e necessary goal of 
comprehensive regional integration, however, should not preclude the achievement of 
sub-regional integrations to whatever extent they may be feasible now.
 
No geostrategy at all is feasible without an institutional infrastructure to enforce it, like that 
which one nds everywhere in the European Union, but nowhere in Latin America. e 
region abounds in failed multilateral organisations; none has ever had depth or staying power. 
e Organisation of American States might have laid some foundation, had it been properly 
developed in ages past, especially as it involves the United States with its multifarious forms 
of capital. Not surprisingly, the United States has shrugged o the OAS as an echo chamber 
of idle anti-American animus. Other, exclusively Latin American organisations, from the 
Andean Group to the Pacic Alliance, underwrite “strategic” universalities like the 
Washington Consensus, but undertake no concrete steps toward an actual geostrategy 
tailored specically to Latin America in its relations with China. e reality is that Latin 
America is woefully unprepared for reality. 
e institutional capacity decit is made worse by the tendency of Latin Americans to polarise 
ideologically between the Right and the Left. Policies that all sides could agree on are trampled 
underfoot in the rush to quarrel over dierences that might or might not be important on 
some level, but are surely irrelevant in the context of a perilous external relationship with a 
rising superpower before whom all biases in the region are similarly situated. Both schools of 
ready-made political thought should be marked “expired” for the duration, until Latin 
America faces up to a hegemon posing potentially existential challenges to its being and 
identity. East Asian countries other than China (China, too, in practice) are better able to 
nesse Western ideological deadlocks when setting their courses of development. Latin 
Americans should assiduously study the pragmatism of countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and South Korea for clues to their own survival as a region in the new age. 
SUMMARY.
After a period of relatively rapid economic growth, emerging markets are facing a much more 
dicult global economic landscape over the medium term, particularly for the many 
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developing nations that are still heavily dependent on resources exports. e slowdown in 
demand and the consequently falling global commodity prices have created signicant 
headwinds for commodity exporters, generating terms-of-trade shocks and resulting in 
weaker export values as well as declining new foreign direct investment inows into their 
commodities sectors. Decisive changes in long-term economic development policies are 
needed by many resource-exporters in Africa and Latin America in order to diversify their 
production structures and exports compositions. 
Among the key strategies we recommend for emerging-market, commodity-exporting 
nations and for the Latin American and Sub-Saharan regions as wholes are to: 
 1. Incentivise and reinforce further the creation of internal regional markets.
 2. Formulate regional development plans for the long term and stick to them. 
 3. Refocus economic policy on industrial development and the promotion of 
 manufacturing. 
 4. Form human capital at a higher rate via vocational and tertiary educational strategies. 
 5. Invest in innovation and R&D, and reduce the legal and administrative costs of starting 
 up and doing business, in the interests of becoming globally more competitive. 
 6. Improve the international competitiveness of the business environment by lowering
 the costs of employment and the regulatory burdens on business.
 7. Reform antiquated and inecient taxation schemes above all.
 8. Adopt a more forward-looking geostrategic foreign policy for at least sub-regions of 
 Latin America. 
Whilst these strategies are all long-term in nature, and cannot be expected to deliver rapid 
short-term solutions to the economic challenges that many resource exporting countries 
currently face, they are essential to delivering economic growth in the long term and 
achieving not only the sustainable development targets of the UN, but also the human 
dignity and the political self-determination of the ordinary citizens of developing nations.
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